This is the forth of a four-part series. Please bring to my attention any typo's or something that just doesn't make sense......scanners are not 100 percent. I appreciate all the kind words for posting these articles. I know that true APBA Baseball fans will benefit from the wealth of information here. Reward yourself and get the updated, 1995 edition of this four-part article from the APBA Journal - see Redskin's home page for the address to order. APBA Primer Reading the APBA Cards - Part 4 Defense by Stephen Hall reproduced with permission The APBA Journal, April 1991 The first two installments of this series on reading the cards of APBA Baseball analyzed the various offensive play results obtainable from any given player card, providing tools for determining the contribution a player would be expected to make to his team's offensive effort. Part 3 provided a description of how the pitcher's ratings and codes are factored into the offensive contributions of the hitters, sometimes enhance, but more often to detract from the positive contributions of the men wielding the bat. In this last section of our primer on interpreting the cards, we will examine the impact that defensive ratings have on plays, and gain an understanding of how to evaluate a player's defensive contributions. Prior to getting into the nitty-gritty of defense, a bit of discussion about card design "trivia” is in order. The assignment of play result numbers is, by and large, consistent from one year to the next. The best hit result will always appear at dice outcome 66. Every card will have a red 25 and 35 result at dice outcome 12 and 65, respectively. The primary error opportunity numbers (red 15-21) will appear at dice outcome 53. This consistency makes the cards easier to read and interpret from year to year. One play result, however, leads a peripatetic existence. Play result 12, of which there is one and only one on each player card, is never placed at the same location from one year to the next. In the 1989 card set, for example, the 12 was located at dice result 34. In the 1990 set (for the 1989 season), red 12 appears at dice outcome 54. The latest card set puts red 12 at dice outcome 61. The 12 will never displace a result at a location that is potentially or normally a positive offensive result, such as the double numbers or 15, 25, 31, and 51. The out value that is displaced from its normal position will settle in at another dice outcome location that is available for variable results such as 13's or additional ground/fly outs. Thus when the 12 was assigned to black 34 for the 1989 card set, where we typically look for the obligatory red 31, that red result so dear to fans of the Hit and Run play, was bumped to dice outcome 46. Assignment of Error and Rare Play Numbers Another piece of trivia concerns the actual assignment of error and rare play opportunity numbers. Novice players typically assume that the incidence of fielding errors is randomized in some appropriate distributional fashion, resulting in middle infielders facing relatively more error producing opportunities, and outfielders and corner infielders relatively less. The means by which this is in fact accomplished is worth knowing, and can sometimes be turned to advantage by an experienced manager. Red play result numbers 15-17 create error opportunities for the left, center, and right fielders, respectively. Red number 18 puts the shortstop on the spot, and number 20 puts the bad hop on the right side of second base. Number 19 will bedevil the third baseman, while red 21 puts the onus on the man manning first. In the process of assigning these numbers to player cards, APBA puts the 15-17 results on cards of players who are primarily outfielders, while results 18-21 are assigned to the players who primarily staff the infield positions. Of the eight non-pitchers on a team who are considered the regulars, each staring outfielder is given one of the three numbers 15-17. The other five players of the starting eight receive between them two 18's, two 20's, and one 19 (the 19 normally going to either the first or third baseman). Effectively this means that the second baseman and shortstop have twice the chance of error against any standard lineup than the third baseman or the outfielders. Red number 21, the result which tests the first baseman, is not assigned to a full time player. This number will usually appear on the card of one backup in fielder. In this way, the first baseman has even less chance of committing an error than does an outfielder. The other two fielding positions, catcher and pitcher, are put to the test by result 22 and 23, respectively. Result 23 will appear on the card of each team's starting shortstop, in addition to the red result 20 placed at dice outcome 53. Result 22, the possible catcher error, is the only error result assigned in a non-standard way. The 22 has an additional function aside from causing potential catcher errors. It is also the result which produces a hit-by-pitch result when it comes up in a Runner on First situation. Consequently, the red 22 is assigned to players (typically, but not invariably, infielders) who have above average rates of getting plunked during the course of the season. There are usually one or two players on each team who are so honored. (The red 15 result has the same HBP outcome with a man on first as the 22, but this number is always assigned to one of the three starting outfielders — presumably the one who was most often hit by a pitch and will appear at dice outcome 53. The red 22 is never assigned to 53; it is always assigned as a secondary and additional result on a player card.) The other way that standard error plays enter into the game is via the pitcher cards' offensive play results. Every pitcher is assigned a red 21 and 23 somewhere on his card. Thus when a pitcher comes to bat, there is a possibility that the opposing pitcher or the first baseman will be put to the test. There is little of value that can be said about the assignment of the rare play numbers, other than to note what they are and to which cards they tend to be assigned. Whereas error numbers 15 to 23 are individually linked to positions, the rare play numbers must, by their nature, lead only indirectly to specific fielding locations. The rare play results are red 36 to 41. Each catcher gets one 36 and one 38. Each pitcher gets a 36. All firstbasemen are assigned a 37 and a 41. Second basemen get just a 36. Third basemen get a 39. Shortstops also bear a 39, along with their responsibility to shoulder the 23 burden. All outfielders wield the mighty red 40. Consider the implications of the allocation of error results, first on a league basis, and then on a replay vs a draft league basis. In the Senior Circuit with pitchers frequently coming to bat, there is a greater frequency of error play results for the pitcher and first baseman. In the Junior Circuit the designated hitter may be nominally an outfielder or a corner infielder, and in either case will not have the error numbers to bedevil the pitcher and first baseman, but will put more pressure on the outfielders or on the middle infielders. If you are managing a team against opponents who will not be using the DH, it makes sense to upgrade your defense at first base. When the time comes to pinch hit for the pitcher, look for a fielding position where you can exploit a weakness, and use a batter with an error result which punishes that weakness. In a draft league environment, a team may feature an imbalance of error result numbers. One team might have two starters with red 19’s, while another may have all three outfielders with red 15's. A team may use a player as a regular who was considered a part time player on his actual major league team, and thus was assigned a red 21. When these things happen, astute managers can take advantage of the knowledge by shifting weak outfielders to positions that are not threatened or by substituting a hard hitting but stone gloved second baseman if there is only one opposing player with a red 20. Likewise, you may want to play your red 19 bearing hitters if the opposing third sacker is a 3B-3, or go for a glove man at third if the opponent has the red 19's. Consider using a shortstop to pinch hit when the pitcher is a P-1. Use infielders for the DH job, or start Tony Phillips in the outfield, when the opposing infield is suspect. Be wary of signing up first basemen for DH duty. The rare play numbers 37 and 41 that they all bear are a frequent cause of pickoffs and injuries, and have led to some spectacular triple plays! Catchers are better at pinch hitting with men on base, as their rare play 36 and 38 results are often the damaging wild pitch or passed ball outcome. There are all kinds of opportunities and hazards that can be exploited or avoided in this fashion. All of which leads us to a formal investigation of the defensive fielding ratings Defensive Position and Ratings Above the columns of offensive play results and just below the player's name, the card contains the player's defensive positions and ratings. A player is assigned a position for each position played in the previous season, even for just one game. The position played most frequently is listed first, with the others in descending order of frequency. For many players, there is just one position. Utility players will have several ratings. Jose Oquendo from the 1988 season had a card that read, “2B8, 3B4, SS8, 1B2, OF1, C5, D*-P1-W”. Truly a man for all seasons. Occasionally there are odd looking outcomes in the assignment of ratings. Every year, a few non pitchers get pitching ratings because they came in to finish off a blowout and preserve the health and sanity of the bullpen (cf. Oquendo). On rare occasions, a managerial stratagem will result in a pitcher rating an OF-1 rating alongside his pitching rating. Some multi-position players play most of their games at a position they are less able to play well, such as Kent Anderson's SS-7 2B-6 3B-4 card (in a moment you will see why these ratings actually make him superior at third base). Fielding Levels in APBA Baseball APBA Baseball breaks fielding into three levels of skill, known as Fielding One, Fielding Two, and Fielding Three. The best fielders will take their fielding results from Fielding One. “Average” fielding ability results in Fielding Two, while sub par defensive play is relegated to Fielding Three. Whenever a play result is other than red 1 through 11, 13 or 14, or 42, the play will be made by one of the fielders. The precise fielding outcome is a cross reference of the play result and the fielding column, either One, Two, or Three. The determination of the appropriate column for fielding is based on the fielding rating of the player involved, or in some cases, on the entire team. In the Basic Game, simplicity is maintained by determining a team fielding rating that is then used for all fielding outcomes regardless of which player is actually making the play. The ratings for all nine fielders are summed, and the total is compared to the ranges for the three fielding ratings. If the team fielding adds to 41 or more, the team is Fielding One; between 36 and 40 earns a team Fielding Two; 35 or less makes a team Fielding Three. A very good defensive player in the Basic Game has no direct effect on the outcome of any one play. His only contribution is to the total ability of the team. In the Master and Computer versions of the game, every fielding play is handled initially by a specific player, and that players fielding ability has a direct bearing on the outcome of the play. The determination of whether the play will be taken from Fielding One, Two, or Three is based on a table known as the Fielding Column Finder Chart. There are six separate tables on the chart: one for shortstops, one for third basemen, one for first basemen, one for the pitcher, one that is used by both second basemen and catchers, and the sixth and last which is used by outfielders, as well as, for a few (usually rare) plays that are the collective responsibility of the entire infield or the entire team. The range of fielding ratings for each position produces from two to five columns of results on each table, with a two dice 11-66 outcome (36 possible) determining the final fielding rating for the play in question. As an example of how this works in a specific situation, consider play result red 27, which is a play always handled initially by the third baseman. When this play occurs with one or more baserunners, the first determination is to which column on the Fielder Chart that is appropriate for the player playing third. His 3B rating, which can range from 3 to 6, will determine the column of the thirdbaseman table to be used. If his rating is 3B-3, then dice outcomes 11-13 will produce a Fielding One result; outcomes 14-22 (a total of 5 chances) will result in Fielding Two; the rest, 23-66 (28 chances out of 36) will yield Fielding Three. By contrast, if the rating for the player is 3B-4, then he will have 14 chances for Fielding One, 11 chances for Fielding Two, and also 11 opportunities to fall into Fielding Three. If he were rated 3B-5, then Fielding One is the result a full 26 times, Fielding Two happens 6 times in 36, and Fielding Three just 4 times in 36 chances. A 3B-6 rating will fail to achieve Fielding One only 5 times out of 36. In all cases, the higher the fielding rating, the better the defensive ability of the player. Each position has its own range of defensive rating assignments. As we have seen, at third base, a player can receive a rating of 3B-3, 3B-4, 3B-5, or 3B-6. (On rare occasions, a player who is conspicuously poor at fielding a position that he played will be assigned a rating one less than the official lowest rating available. The fielding result is still taken from the worst column actually on the Finder Chart. The only real effect is on the collective rating of the team, most significant in the Basic Game.) Although any fielding rating can result in any one of the three fielding outcomes, we talk about the defensive ability of players on the basis of their relative standing in the rating scale. Thus, at third base, a player assigned 3B-3 is considered a Fielding Three defender. A 3B-4 rating is an average, Fielding Two glove, while the achievement of 3B-5 earns the recognition of Fielding One ability. The 3B-6 is a sign of exceptional play and is only rarely given to a player. Indeed, in many years there are no third basemen in all of major league baseball awarded the 3B-6. (Brooks Robinson did receive it several times.) We can refer to this ne plus ultra rating as Fielding One Plus. Likewise, at shortstop, there are ratings that are considered Fielding One (SS-9), Fielding Two (SS-8), and Fielding Three (SS-7), and the rare player will occasionally be granted an SS-10 for truly sparkling and error free play (Cal Ripken in the current 1990 season card set is an SS-10). Because the position of shortstop and second base is so critical to good defensive play, there are actually five position ratings on the Finder Chart at these positions. Particularly inept shortstops, like HoJo of the Mets, will get the richly deserved SS6 for proving every year that he has yet to successfully demonstrate an ability to play the position with any consistency. At second base, the possible ratings range from 5 to 9, with a 2B-8 considered Fielding One, a 2B-7 the equivalent of Fielding Two, and a 2B-6 the Dr. Strangeglove Fielding Three. (Why do the Mets seem to specialize in earning these low ratings?) The 2B-9 is Fielding One Plus, but this rating is easier to earn, and there are usually two or three 2B-9's in each card set, beginning with Ryne Sandberg. The 2B-5 is also a possibility, but it takes truly horrific play to be assigned this lowly rating. The same table and range of ratings used for second basemen is also applied to catchers. Again, there will usually be one or two C-9's in a set, with a few C-8’s, many C-7’s, and some well deserved C-4 and C-5 ratings. The table for first basemen has just four possible ratings, mirroring the situation for the other corner infield position, but the range of ratings here is from 2 to 5, rather than 3 to 6. Also unlike the situation at third, the top rating, 1B-5, is a plus rating that is easier to earn than the 3B-6. Hence the 1B-4 is still a good Fielding One defender, the 1B-3 is your average play maker, and only the 1B-2 is truly an embarrassment to the team. Don Mattingly is the current contemporary exemplar of the 1B-5, while Keith Hernandez, during his New York years, gave Gotham a pair of starting 1B-5 All Stars. The outfield positions are not differentiated when ratings are assigned. Rather than assigning separate ratings for CF, LF, and RF, there is a single OF rating made for all outfielders. Also, the situation for outfielders is more restricted. There are but three ratings for outfielders, matching the three Fielding Column possibilities. A good fielder gets his OF-3 rating and usually gets his plays from Fielding One (28 times out of 36). The OF-2 matches Fielding Two (and provides exactly a one third chance for Fielding One, Two, or Three). The OF-1 should probably not be allowed out on the turf (he is in Fielding Three as often as the OF-3 is in Fielding One), but many teams have no recourse but to put the good bat, no glove outfielders on the field. Since the advent of the DH, many players who never trample the grass are given OF-1 ratings, because it is a gospel tenet of APBA that virtually every player is a potential fielder... somewhere (Herb Washington was the exception that proves the rule). It seems strange to lump Kevin Mitchell in the same class with Larry Sheets, but the limited range of available outfielder ratings makes such anomalies a regular feature of the game system. Rounding out the group are the pitchers, who are collectively rated either good (P-2) or bad (P-1). There is no middle ground, no such thing as an average fielder at pitcher. The P-2 is in Fielding One two-thirds of the time; the P-1 is in Fielding Three just as often. The people at APBA who decide which ratings to assign just did not want to have to sort pitchers as fielders into any more precise groups than that. Fielding Ratings … a Subjective Matter Speaking of ratings assignments, there is simply no standard, established algorithm for determining what rating a player will receive for a season based on his fielding statistics. The weakness of all fielding statistics is reflected in the arbitrary and often idiosyncratic assignment of fielding ratings to players. This manager marvels at Pete Incaviglia's OF-2, and likewise at Lance Parrish's C-7. Everyone has their own particular disagreements with the ratings assigned in Lancaster. As best I can recall, Tony Fernandez has never been given an S-10. In particular, rookies are rarely given credit for performances that would earn good ratings for an established player. Sandy Alomar’s first year C-8 was as much a testimony to his minor league reputation as to his sterling rookie defensive performance. (Benito Santiago was a C-7 his rookie year.) Let’s recap the ratings at each level. Fielding One: C-8, 1B-4, 2B-8, 3B-5, SS-9, OF-3. Fielding Two: C-7, 1B-3, 2B-7, 3B-4, SS-8, OF-2. Fielding Three: C-6, 1B-2, 2B-6, 3B-3, SS-7, OF-1. Fielding One Plus: C-9, 1B-5, 2B-9, 3B-6 (rare), SS-10 (also rare). Remember, there are but three actual fielding possibilities; Fielding One Plus is just my way of identifying the exceptional fielders who will earn a Fielding One result even more frequently than the regular Fielding One players. It seems reasonable to think of Fielding One as exceptional, Fielding Two as average, and Fielding Three as deficient, and to an extent this is how they stack up relative to one another, but there are critical differences between the positions that it pays a wise manager to be aware of. (These considerations do not apply to the Basic Game, where fielding is determined on a team-wide basis.) Fielding and Good Managing in APBA How does one use fielding considerations when managing a team? Perhaps the easiest lesson to learn concerns outfield positioning. On the Bases Empty chart, red result 16 and 17 (to CF and RF, respectively) are fly outs on Fielding One and Two, but become a Single plus another base on error at Fielding Three. Result 15, the fly ball to left field, is not so forgiving. The Fielding Three result matches the other two (hit plus base on error), but at Fielding Two, the result is “First on Error, E-LF”. Clearly there is an extra cost for putting your worst fielder in left field. Even an OF-2 will botch the play two times in three when playing out in left. If you have but one OF-3 on your starting lineup, you will do yourself an injustice if you position him in any field other than left. (Of course, if there are no red 15's on any of the batter cards in the opposition lineup, then it is perfectly logical to put an OF-1 in left field.) The weakness of the left field position is perpetuated throughout the play result boards. The one mitigating compensation for a Fielding Three LF is that with a Man on First, a red 15 is an HBP result rather than an error chance to left field. The best place to hide an OF-1, other than as a DH, is probably in right field. (Are you listening, Darryl?) Using a Fielding Three outfielder in center will not cost you with the same frequency as he will in left, but when the center fielder boots the play, the result is often more horrendous and costly than when the faux pas is committed by the corner outfielders. The problem with putting poor fielders in RF is that they often lack the arm rating necessary to threaten runners going from first to third on a hit. [Fielder arm ratings, like catcher Throw ratings and Stealing ratings, do not appear on the APBA player card. These and other ratings are grouped on the Master Game Symbols Chart, which is sold separately from the cards. We have chosen to disregard these extended ratings in creating this primer on the technique of reading cards. For the most part, such ratings are concerned with limited areas of game play that are better left to articles specifically addressing those features of the game.] The quality of infield defense has a direct bearing on errors committed, with the middle infield positions being the more critical as they are more likely to be subjected to a testing fielding play. As with the left field situation just described, both Fielding Two and Three result in errors at second and short on the Bases Empty board. In increasingly critical situations, these two positions will make costly miscues at Fielding Two, as well as, at Fielding Three. A SS-9 and 2B-8 up the middle will provide any manager enormous peace of mind over the course of a long season. Playing an SS-7 and 2B-6 with any regularity is a prescription for insomnia and heartburn. (Just ask Davy Johnson.) Aside from the more obvious error results, poor fielding ability in the infield will result in more base runner advancement, fewer force outs, fewer double plays, and occasional hits that with better fielding would have been outs. A critical component of good defensive baseball is keeping the opposition out of scoring position, namely off of second or third base. Better, higher rated infielders are more likely to get the force out on a runner, rather than make the play at first with the runner advancing. In the Runner on First situation, most double plays arise from red results 24 and 25, which are automatic GIDP's at all fielding ratings. However, there are other fielding results which can obtain a double play in this situation, but only in the Fielding One column. Result 27, the play by the third baseman, is a double play with the Runner on First only in the Fielding One column (but note that it will be converted to “Out at First, Runner to Second” if the runner was not being held). Fielding Two on play 27 is a fielder's choice force out, and Fielding Three is an Out at First, Runner to Second. Likewise, result 26, which is the second baseman's other standard fielding play (along with red 25) can gain a GIDP with a Runner on First, but only in Fielding One, and at that only with the batter rated as a (S)low runner. But with all these lumbering DH's coming to bat, wouldn’t a few more GIDP’s come in handy? A 2B-8 or 2B-9 can make that play a staple of your defensive arsenal. With Runners on First and Second, or First and Third, play result red 28, to the shortstop, can get you a double play with good fielding, but can leave you with runners at the comers or on second and third with mediocre defensive play. The second baseman has no ability to accomplish the DP in the First and Second situation on his personal red 26 play at any fielding rating, but with runners at the corners, play result red 26 gets the DP at Fielding One, gets the out at first with Fielding Three (but no score on the play), and can turn the DP at Fielding Two except when the batter is a fast runner. From the downside risk point of view, a poor shortstop can actually fail to convert the almost automatic GIDP on result 24 if he is in Fielding Three with Runners on First and Second (this happens when the batter is a fast runner). The same is true for result 25 on the 2B side. Perhaps the most critical standard fielding play anywhere in the APBA infield occurs at first base! When the Master Game was devised, APBA wanted a play that demonstrated the effect of hitting the ball to the right side of the infield when a runner was being held on first base. That play result is our wandering friend, red 12. Consider what happens when a 12 is the result with a Runner on First. At Fielding Three, the chart reads “Safe at 1st; runner out, F.C.; A-1B PO-SS; HO-PR or SA — SINGLE to right; runner to second;(NH or HO) PO-1B unassisted (W-base on balls)” In English, this means that the runner is forced out at second, but only if the runner was not held, or the batter was rated PL (a pull hitter to left), or there are two outs. When the runner is being held on (HO), and the batter hits PR (pull right) or the much more common SA (straight away), then the result of this fielding play is a base hit! (As we saw in the last installment on pitching, this play also serves as a great example of the price of [W]ildness.) Now consider what the same chart displays at Fielding One for red result 12. “Double play; A-1B PO-SS A-SS PO-1B; HO-BL - Safe at 1st; runner out; F.C.; A-1B PO-SS*(NH or HO) PO-1B unassisted (W-base on balls)”. The “HO BL” part means that when the runner was being held on and the batter was hitting from the left side, then instead of a double play the result is only a fielder’s choice. Which result would you rather have as the defender? A double play (at minimum a fielder’s choice), or a SINGLE resulting in runners on 1st and 2nd? Need I ask? Knowing this, would you want Dave Parker (1B-2) manning first base for your team? Are you sure you want Cecil Fielder (1B-2) in place of Glenn Davis (1B-4)? And if you think the solution is to just back the mis-monikered Fielder away from the bag, taking off the hold, the price will be a rash of stolen bases and “Out at First, Runner to Second plays handed to the opposition team. The red 12 result DP-or-Single also applies in the Runners on First and Third situation. Furthermore, I am not so sure that the Computer Game gives you the automatic unassisted putout in the two out situation, as does the Master Game board. I have often seen what looks like the red 12 result go for a single in a two out situation on the computer. The moral of all this id to honor what all experienced APBA Master Game players know: Defense does make a noticeable difference in the game, between two otherwise evenly matched teams. Rare plays, sacrifices, and fielding with the infield drawn in are all affected by the quality of the defenders in the field. Fielding One teams see most rare plays end as something along the lines of, “Fly out; PO-RF.” If your taste for thrills runs to plays such as, “SINGLE to right; runner scores; other runner to third on error and then scores on wild throw; batter to second on error; E-RF E-RF”, then by all means get those OF-1's into the outfield. Your APBA baseball experience will surely provide you with “never a dull moment”. Every manager is entitled to his own philosophy of how to put together a winning team. Some will emphasize power, others power pitching. Some will want solid defense, others will play a Wllliams or Johnson at SS. One manager will choose speed, relying on the liberal use of steals and the hit and run play, while another accepts slow runners and station to station play in return for the frequent three run HR. Whatever your philosophy, you will improve your game if you pay attention to the fundamentals; not of tactics on the field, but of card analysis and the interdependence of hitting with pitching and defense in the world of APBA Baseball.